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THE PROPER ROLE OF THE ESTATE AND GIFT 
TAXATION OF CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES 
Eric D. Chason· 
Robert T. Danforth •• 
Editors' Synopsis: The authors argue that the goals of estate and gift 
taxation are not served by taxing closely held businesses when the 
recipient of the business actively participates in its operation. Further, 
the authors suggest that taxing closely held businesses tends to harm 
capital production. The authors propose an approach to estate and 
gift taxation that encourages productive behavior by the recipients of 
wealth. 
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1. Microeconomic Analysis of Inheritance and Recipi-
ents' Work Effons 
2. Empirical Evidence of the Effect of Inheritance on 
Work Effons 
3. A Work-Based Policy of the Estate and Gift Tax 
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The federal government imposes estate1 and giff taxes3 on gratuitous 
transfers made at death and during life by relatively wealthy people. 4 The 
1 I.R.C. §§ 2001-22078 (1994) . 
2 I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (1994). 
3 For convenience, we refer to the estate tax and the gift tax collectively as "the 
estate and gift tax" even though transfer taxation comprises separate taxes. Although the 
generation-skipping transfer tax is part of this system, this tax is not central to our thesis. 
4 Edward J . McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Weallh Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE 
L.J. 283, 299 (1994) (referring to "the very wealthy families who are the only ones 
paying" estate taxes). I.R.C. § 2001, which sets out the rate schedule for estate and gift 
taxation, imposes a tax of $192,800 on estates and "adjusted lifetime gifts" that total 
$600,000 in value. This tax, however, is precisely offset by the "unified credit" of I.R.C. 
§ 2010(a). Moreover, I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 provide an unlimited deduction for most 
interspousal transfers. Thus, a spouse with $1,200,000 may give $600,000 to the other 
spouse. Both may then avail themselves of their individual unified credits, leaving neither 
with any transfer tax liability. Hence, a de facto minimum taxable estate size for married 
couples is at least $1,200,000, but competent planning allows the tax-free transfer of even 
more wealth by a married couple. Cf. John E. Donaldson, The Future of Transfer 
Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 539, 546-48 (1993) (discussing other, more sophisticated planning techniques); 
George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated &tate Tax 
Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 passim (1977) (describing federal transfer taxes as 
"voluntary"). 
SPRING 1997 The Proper Role of Estate and Gift Taxation lOS 
rate of taxation on these transfers is high, 5 and, without proper estate 
planning, the taxes can claim a large portion of any taxable transfer. The 
transfer taxes are particularly burdensome, however, for the recipients of 
interests in closely held businesses. These interests are often difficult to 
value, 6 and their owners may face liquidity problems because a ready 
market for interests in closely held businesses does not exist. 7 Congress has 
partially responded to the concerns of owners of closely held businesses 
with special provisions in the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter I.R.C. or 
Code]. These provisions deal with some unusual valuation situations, 8 allow 
for installment payments of the estate tax,9 and permit sale or exchange 
treatment for certain redemptions of stock10 following a decedent's death. 11 
Members of Congress have proposed even more lenient treatment of 
closely held businesses under the estate tax12 because of its perceived 
harshness and its potential to force the liquidation of businesses. 13 Leniency 
may be improvident, however, if the only problems facing closely held 
businesses under the estate tax are steep rates and illiquidity. The rates 
under I.R.C. § 2001 are no higher for closely held enterprises than they are 
for any other form of wealth, and the deferral allowances of the Code14 
should solve true liquidity problems. 
5 Compare I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1994) (imposing a maximum marginal rate of 55% on 
the taxable estate) with I.R.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (imposing a maximum marginal 
rate of39.6% on income). 
6 See Zinichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Srock in Closely Held 
Corporations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 65, 65 (1993); see also infra Part IJ.E (discussing 
valuation difficulties facing closely held businesses). 
7 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency 
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273-77 (1986). 
8 See I.R.C. § 2032A (1994); see generally infra Part 11.0 .1. (discussing § 2032A). 
9 See l.R.C. § 6166 (1994); see generally infra Part 11.0.2. (discussing§ 6166). 
10 A redemption occurs when a corporation buys its own stock from a shareholder. 
The issue is whether the Code deems the transaction to be a sale of stock or a dividend. 
See infa notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
1 See l.R.C. § 303 (1994); see generally infra Part 11.0.3. (discussing§ 303). 
12 Cf. 141 CoNG. REC. S14883-07, S14897 (1995) (proposing an exclusion from 
estate taxation of $1 .5 million and 50% above that amount of a closely owned business 
under certain circumstances); 143 CONG. REc. S163-02, S176 (1997) (proposing the 
samel:. 
3 See 141 CONG. REC. S14883-07, S14884 (1995) ("[M]any times these enterprises 
are literally forced out of business because of the imposition of the estate tax."). 
14 See infra Part 11 .0.2. (discussing I.R.C. § 6166). 
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Perhaps closely held businesses deserve greater leniency under the 
estate and gift tax because taxing the transfer of closely held businesses does 
not further the goals of wealth transfer taxation. One important goal of 
taxing wealth transfers is decreasing inherited wealth, thereby encouraging 
beneficiaries of these transfers to engage in productive work. 15 What if the 
recipient of an interest in a closely held business intends to participate 
actively in the business? If so, the recipient fulfills the goal of encouraging 
productive work even if the tax is not imposed. No tax, or a diminished tax 
in this situation, may be beneficial because the tax generates little revenue. 16 
Moreover, the tax may deter the production of capital. 17 
This Article argues that encouraging productive work by recipients of 
wealth may be the only goal of the estate and gift tax that is both achievable 
and economically sound. 18 Taxing the transfer of closely held businesses in 
which the recipients will be active participants not only fails to further this 
goal, but also detrimentally affects capital production. 
Part II of this Article outlines the present system of taxing wealth 
transfers and describes special provisions applicable to closely held 
businesses. Part II also highlights many of the problems with the applica-
tion of the present system to closely held businesses. Part III catalogues 
several justifications for taxing wealth transfers. It concludes that 
encouraging productive work by recipients of wealth is the only economi-
cally sound goal, and that it is the only goal that the present system 
successfully accomplishes. Part IV builds on this foundation by analyzing 
the treatment of closely held businesses under the present system. It shows 
that interests in closely held businesses are theoretically distinct from other 
forms of wealth and that this difference justifies a reduction of transfer 
taxation of these interests. Indeed, taxing them encourages the donor to 
IS See McCaffery, supra note 4, at 320-21; Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited 
Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 99 (1990) ("Great wealth confers tremendous disincentives 
to work."). 
16 See Donaldson, supra note 4, at 542-43; BORIS I. BITIKER & EUAS ClARK, 
FEDERALEsTATEAND GIFr TAXATION 1 (6th ed. 1990) ("The taxes that are the subject of 
this book are not important sources of government revenue."). 
17 MICHAELJ. BOSKJN, AN ECONOMIST'S PERSPECTIVEON ESTATE TAXATION 62-63, 
in DEA'lll, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 56 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). 
18 See infra Part 111.0. 
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engage in inefficient behavior, which is not offset by any gains from 
encouraging the donee's efficient behavior. 
ll. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 
This overview highlights the basic operation of the estate and gift tax, 
emphasizes the application of the tax to closely held businesses, and 
demonstrates a few of the incentives for taxpayers that the tax creates. This 
discussion establishes the starting point for finding the proper goal of the 
estate and gift tax, a topic explored further in Part III. 
A. The Estate Tax 
The estate tax provisions of the Code define the decedent's gross 
estate by its value as of the decedent's death19 or six months afterwards if 
the executor so elects. 20 This value is "of all property, real or personal, 
tangible or intangible, wherever situated, "21 but only "to the extent of the 
interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death. "22 In short, the 
gross estate equals the value of the decedent's interest in property at death 
or six months afterwards. 
The Code imposes an estate tax, however, only upon the decedent's 
taxable estate,23 which is the decedent' s gross estate less certain 
deductions. 24 The most prominent among these deductions is the marital 
deduction, which allows for an unlimited deduction from the gross estate for 
19 See l.R.C. § 2031(a) (1994). 
20 See I.R.C. § 2032(a) (1994). Section 2032(c) limits the availability of this election 
to situations in which the transfer tax burden will be reduced. The purpose of this limita· 
tion is to prevent executors from using the election to obtain a higher income tax basis for 
the decedent's property in situations in which the higher value will produce no additional 
transfer taxes. See infra Part II.C. 
21 See I.R.C. § 2031(a); see also§§ 2035-2038, 2041 (1994) (including in the gross 
estate certain lifetime transfers). 
22 See I.R.C. § 2033 (1994). 
23 See I.R.C. § 200l(a) (1994). The executor of the estate is responsible for actually 
payin:§ the tax. See I.R.C. § 2002 (1994). 
See I.R.C. § 2051 (1994). 
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most bequests to a swviving spouse. 25 The Code also provides an unlimited 
deduction for bequests to charities26 and allows other deductions for casualty 
losses,27 as well as for various other expenses, indebtedness, and taxes.28 
I.R.C. § 2001 imposes the estate tax on the decedent's taxable 
estate.29 In most cases only those estates worth more than $600,000 have 
any potential estate-tax liability because of the unified credit. 30 The Code 
provides other credits for state death taxes31 and foreign death taxes. 32 
Thus, the net tax liability of the estate is its gross liability under I.R.C. 
§ 2001, less any applicable credits. 
B. The Gift Tax 
"A tax ... on the transfer of property by gift"33 is the subject of the 
gift tax provisions of the Code. The Code imposes this tax on the donor's 
taxable gifts,34 which the Code defines as total gifts less certain deductions.35 
The Code values these gifts by reference to the date of the gift. 36 
The deductions from the donor's gifts mirror some of the deductions 
from a decedent's gross estate.37 Donors may deduct most charitable38 and 
spousal gifts39 from their total gifts when computing taxable gifts. 40 
25 See I.R.C. § 2056 (1994). 
26 See I.R.C. § 2055 (1994 & Supp. 1996). 
27 See I.R.C. § 2054 (1994). 
28 See I.R.C. § 2053 (1994). 
29 See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1)(A) (1994). I.R.C. § 2001 actually imposes the tax on the 
sum of the decedent's taxable estate and the value of her "adjusted taxable gifts." See 
also i.:f..a Part II.B. (discussing the gift tax). 
See I.R.C. § 2010(a) (1994). 
31 See I.R.C. § 2001 (1994). 
32 See I.R.C. § 2014 (1994). 
33 See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(l) (1994). 
34 See I.R.C. § 2502(a) (1994). 
3.5 See I.R.C. § 2503(a) (1994). 
36 See I.R.C. § 2512(a) (1994). 
37 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (describing, among other things, the 
marital and charitable deductions). 
38 See I.R.C. § 2522(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996). 
39 See I.R.C. § 2523(a) (1994). 
40 See I.R.C. § 2503(a) (1994). 
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Moreover, the Code excludes some donative transfers from the donor's gifts 
for gift tax purposes. Importantly, it grants the donor a $10,000 exclusion 
for gifts per donee during each calendar year, 41 and grants the donor an 
unlimited exclusion for certain educational and medical expenses paid on 
behalf of third parties. 42 
Donors compute their gift tax liability under the estate tax schedule, 43 
and the tax is cumulative. Donors may take only one trip through the 
progressive rate schedule rather than beginning at the bottom of the schedule 
at its lower rates each year. 44 Moreover, the gift tax liability is reduced to 
the extent of the unified credit against gift taxes,45 which allows a donor to 
make up to $600,000 in lifetime gifts without incurring any gift tax 
liability. 46 
The combined rate schedules47 and credits for the estate tax and the 
gift tax48 substantially unify the estate and gift tax regimes. Nonetheless, 
41 See I.R.C. § 2503(a) (i994). For example, a person with four children may give 
each of them $10,000 annually without facing any gift tax liability for the transfers. 
Moreover, I.R.C. § 2513 allows a husband and wife to elect to treat all of their gifts as 
made one-half by each. See I.R.C. § 2513(a)(l) (1994). Thus, under this "split gift" 
rule, one spouse could transfer $20,000 annually to each donee without either spouse 
facing any gift tax liability as long as the other spouse transferred nothing else to these 
donees. An important limitation on these annual exclusion gifts is that they must be of a 
present interest in property to qualify. 
42 See I.R.C. § 2503(e) (1994). 
43 See I.R.C. § 2502(a) (1994). 
44 Every year the donor first computes her liability based on the aggregate of her 
lifetime taxable gifts including taxable gifts made during the current year. See I.R.C. 
§ 2502(a)(l) {1994). Next, she computes her liability on the aggregate of her lifetime 
taxable gifts excluding taxable gifts made during the current year. See I.R.C. 
§ 2502(a)(2) (1994). The difference constitutes her gift tax liability for the current year. 
See I.R.C. § 2502(a) (1994). This method of computation buttresses the progressive 
nature of the gift tax. 
45 See I.R.C. § 2505(a) (1994). 
46 See supra note 4. 
47 See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1994). 
48 Using the gift tax credit under J.R.C. § 2505(a) effectively reduces the available 
estate tax credit under I.R.C. § 2010(a). I.R.C. § 2010(a) does not, however, contain 
any language to effect this reduction. See I.R.C. § 2010(a) (1994). I.R.C. § 200l(b)(2) 
decreases the amount of estate tax liability by the amount of gift tax "which would have 
been payable" under the present schedule on lifetime gifts. The gift tax credit decreases 
the amount of gift tax "which would have been payable," thus decreasing the reduction 
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important differences between the two remain. The Code demonstrates a 
preference for lifetime gifts not only by providing for the $10,000 annual 
exclusion, 451 but also by utilizing different mechanics for computing the gift 
tax and the estate tax. Because of these different mechanics, the gift tax 
imposes a lower effective rate than does the estate tax on identical 
transfers, 50 even though the nominal rates are the same. The income tax, 
however, partially offsets this incentive for inter vivos giving. 51 
C. Related Income Tax Provisions 
I.R.C § l02(a) flatly states that "[g]ross income does not include the 
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance. "52 
Nonetheless, the recipient of such a transfer must pay income tax on the 
postgift income that arises from the transferred property. 53 
A recipient of property by a gratuitous transfer must have a tax basis 
in the property to determine gain upon subsequent sale. This basis differs, 
however, depending on whether the transfer was testamentary or inter 
vivos. If testamentary, then the recipient's basis is generally the fair market 
value of the property as of the decedent's death. !14 If inter vivos, however, 
then the recipient's basis is generally the lesser of the pre-gift basis and the 
fair market value. 55 
from the estate tax liability. See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2) (1994). 
49 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
so Michael A. Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History 
and the Interpretation ojTax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 852 n.148 (1991). Essen-
tially, the estate tax "taxes the tax," whereas the gift tax does not. Hence a donor may 
pay the gift tax resulting from a lifetime gift without incurring additional gift tax liability. 
In contrast, an estate pays estate tax even on the portion of the estate used to pay the 
estate tax; this is similar to the operation of the income tax. 
51 See infra Part II.C; see also infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text (discussing 
the coordination between income tax basis rules for gratuitous transfers and the taxation 
of the transfers). 
52 I.R.C. § 102(a) (1994) . 
53 See I.R.C. § 102(b) (1994). Subchapter J of the Code provides a comprehensive 
scheme for the income taxation of trusts, estates, and beneficiaries thereof. See generally 
I.R.C. §§ 671-92 (1994) {taxing the income of trusts and estates). 
!14 See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(l) (1994). See also I.R.C. § 1014(b) (1994) (enumerating 
the testamentary transfers to which the step-up-in-basis rule applies). 
55 See I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1994). 
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D. Estate and Gift Tax Provisions for Closely Held Businesses 
The Code contains a handful of special provisions that apply to closely 
held businesses. The most important of these are the valuation rules of 
I.R.C. § 2032A, the estate tax deferral provisions of I.R.C. § 6166, and the 
corporate redemption rules of I.R.C. § 303. All of these provisions, 
however, have significant deficiencies that limit their effectiveness in 
relieving the estate tax burden for owners of closely held businesses. 
Moreover, these provisions have no application to inter vivos transfers. 
1. Section 2032A 
The value of the gross estate is usually its fair market value,56 which 
is generally based on the property's "highest and best use. "51 Under I.R.C. 
§ 2032A, however, the executor of an estate may make a special valuation 
election for "qualified real property . . . used as a farm for farming 
purposes or in another trade or business. "58 The election allows the execu-
tor to value the property on the basis of its actual use rather than its highest 
and best use. 59 For the estate to avail itself of this election, the deceased 
owner (or a member of the owner's family) must "materially participate in 
the operation of the farm or other business ... ro Because the owner of a 
closely held business often materially participates in the operation of the 
business, I.R.C. § 2032A has the potential to provide a substantial discount61 
for the valuation of interests in closely held businesses. 
The technical requirements of I. R. C. § 2032A, 62 however, often limit 
its usefulness to the estate of the deceased owner of a closely held business. 
56 See I.R.C. §§ 2031-32 (1994). 
51 See Michael F. Beau~ang et al., Valuation: General and Real Estate, 830 TAX 
MGT. PORTFOUO at A-26 (1995). 
58 Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(a) (1996). 
59 s id ee . 
ro ld. 
61 The maximum reduction in value available under I.R.C. § 2032A is $750,000. 
See I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(2) (1994). 
62 I.R.C. § 2032A is one of the longest of the Internal Revenue Code estate tax 
provisions, and its technical complexities are legendary. See ROBERT B. STEPHENS, ET 
AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, 4.04(2) (7th ed. 1997) (describing I.R.C. 
§ 2032A as "a very intricate piece of legislation"). 
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To qualify under I.R.C. § 2032A, at least 25% of the value of the gross 
estate must consist of real property satisfying the qualified use 
requirements. 63 For many closely held businesses other than farming 
operations, real estate constitutes a relatively small portion of its total value. 
In addition, the use value of real property in a business other than a farming 
operation is likely to equal its fair market value because the property is 
probably in its highest and best use. In this case, I.R.C. § 2032A provides 
no valuation relief. Furthermore, even when the estate satisfies the 
requirements of I.R.C. § 2032A, any valuation adjustment applies to the 
real property-not to other valuable assets of the business. For these 
reasons, I.R.C. § 2032A affords little practical estate tax relief for most 
owners of closely held businesses, other than farms. 
2. Section 6166 
The executor of an estate generally must pay taxes when the estate tax 
return is due,64 which is ·nine months after the decedenfs death.65 Under 
I.R.C. § 6166, the executor may obtain an extension of time to pay estate 
taxes "[i]f the value of an interest in a closely held business . . . exceeds 35 
percent of the adjusted gross estate. "66 The ratio of the value of the closely 
held business to the amount of the adjusted gross estate determines the 
maximum amount of estate tax to which the extension may apply. 67 The 
estate may begin paying the extended tax five years after it would otherwise 
be due,68 and may do so in two to ten equal, annual installments. 69 If the 
maximum deferral period is selected, the final installment of estate taxes 
will not be due until fourteen years~ after the ordinary date for paying estate 
taxes. 
63 See I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(l)(B) (1994). 
64 See I.R.C. § 6151(a) (1994). 
6S See I.R.C. § 607S(a) (1994). 
66 See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(l) (1994). 
67 See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(2) (1994) . 
68 See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(3) (1994) . 
69 See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(l) (1994) . 
70 The latest payment d;1te for the first installment is five years after the date pre-
scribed by I.R.C. § 61Sl(a). See I.R.C. § 6166(a)(3) (1994). The tenth installment will 
occur nine years after the first. Hence, the maximum deferral period is 14 years. 
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Unlike I.R.C. § 2032A, I.R.C. § 6166 does not reduce the estate tax 
burden applicable to interests in closely held businesses. By design, I.R.C. 
§ 6166 addresses liquidity concerns. The legislative history describes this 
purpose as follows: 
This provision is primarily designed to make it possible to keep 
together a business enterprise where the death of one of the 
larger owners of the business results in an imposition of a 
relatively heavy estate tax. Where the decedent had a substan-
tial portion of his estate invested in the business enterprise, 
under existing law this may confront the heirs with the neces-
sity of either breaking up the business or of selling it to some 
larger business enterprise, in order to obtain funds to pay the 
federal estate tax .... Therefore, although not removing any 
federal estate tax in these cases, your committee hopes that by 
spreading out the period over which the estate tax may be paid, 
it will be possible for the estate tax in most cases to be paid for 
out of the earnings of the business, or at least that it will 
provide the heirs with time to obtain funds to pay the federal 
estate tax without upsetting the operation of the business. Your 
committee believes that this provision is particularly important 
in preventing corporate mergers and in maintaining the free 
enterprise system. 71 
Thus, the ostensible purpose of the provision is to defer estate taxes but not 
to forgive them. In many respects, I.R.C. § 6166 provides a benefit to the 
estate no more valuable than a loan from a commercial lender. 72 
71 H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1959-2 C.B. 709, 713 
(discussing the original version of I.R.C. § 6166, enacted in 1958 as part of the 
Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 206). I.R.C. § 6166 was 
subsequently modified. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-455, § 2004(a); 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 422; Tax Reform Act of 
1984? Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1021. 
2 In one significant respect, a commercial loan may prove more valuable to the 
estate. The interest payments under I.R.C. § 6166 may be deducted for estate tax 
purposes under I.R.C. § 2053, which, in general, allows a deduction for expenses of 
administration. J.R.C. § 2053(a)(2) (1994). Currently, however, the I.R.C. § 6166 
interest obligation may be deducted for estate tax purposes only as the obligation is 
incurred. See Rev. Proc. 81-27, 1981-2 C.B. 548 (requiring the periodic filing of revised 
estate tax returns). In the case of a commercial term loan with no pre-payment option, an 
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In only one limited sense does I.R.C. § 6166 forgive any tax: a 
preferential 4% interest rate applies to a portion of the deferred estate 
taxes.73 Under I.R.C. § 66010), a 4% interest rate applies to an amount 
equal to the lesser of (1) the total estate taxes deferred or (2) the estate taxes 
attributable to the first $1,000,000 of closely held business property. 74 In 
most cases, the estate tax attributable to the first $1,000,000 of business 
property is $153,000 ($345,800 reduced by the available unified credit). 
The value of this tax benefit for a particular taxpayer depends on the 
difference between the 4% interest rate and the otherwise applicable interest 
rate on deferred taxes (which, under I.R.C. § 6621, is the federal short-
term rate plus 3% ). 7$ Assuming an otherwise applicable interest rate of 8%, 
the value of the benefit of the lower 4% rate is $38,769.36.76 For a taxable 
estate worth $3,000,<XX> or more, in which case the marginal estate tax rate 
is 55%,77 the savings correspond to a $70,489.7478 reduction in the value of 
the estate for tax purposes. Thus, based on an 8% discount rate, the most 
that I.R.C. § 6166 permits is tax forgiveness79 for a $70,489.74 portion of 
estimate of the interest to be incurred throughout the payment period may be deducted up 
front on the original estate tax return. See Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, 56 
T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988). The reason for this difference in treatment is that, under 
l.R.C. § 2053, an expense is deductible only if the amount of the expense "is ascertain-
able with reasonable certainty and will be paid. No deduction may be taken upon the 
basis of a vague or uncertain estimate." Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-l(b)(3) (as amended in 
1972). The position of both the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter Service] and the 
United States Tax Court is that the amount of interest payable under l.R.C. § 6166 cannot 
be determined with reasonable certainty until the interest is actually paid because the 
taxpayer may at any time voluntarily or involuntarily prepay the deferred tax. See Estate 
ofBaillyv. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 246 (1983); see also Rev. Proc. 81-27, 1981-2 C.B. 
547 ~etting forth the procedure for deducting interest as it accrues). 
See l.R.C. § 6601G) (1994). 
14ld. 
15 See l.R.C. § 6621(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996). 
76 This number is the net present value of a $153,000 loan bearing interest at 4%, 
with the longest term to maturity under I.R.C. § 6166, assuming a discount rate of 8%. 
77 See l.R.C. § 2001(a) (1994). 
78 This number is $38,769.36 divided by 0.55, which is the highest marginal estate 
tax rate. 
79 Using the I.R.C. § 6601G) interest rate as a means of effecting estate tax relief for 
closely held businesses is unsatisfying for several reasons. First, assuming that it is 
appropriate to tax certain closely held businesses more favorably than other interests, see 
infra Part ll.D.3., granting that favorable treatment through l.R.C. § 6166 affords 
favorable treatment to certain interests that arguably should not be treated favorably and 
also denies favorable treatment to interests that should be treated favorably. For exam-
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the closely held business interest. 80 Furthermore, even the modest savings 
associated with the 4% interest rate are unavailable if the closely held 
business interest is represented in part by stock in a holding company. 81 
3. Section 303 
A redemption occurs when a corporation buys its stock from a 
shareholder in exchange for property. 82 The tax treatment of the redemp-
tion depends upon I.R.C. § 302. The Code treats some redemptions as 
sales of stock83 and other redemptions as distributions, which are usually 
ple, the provisions of J.R.C. §§ 6166, 6601(j) are available whether or not the recipients 
of the property are active participants in the closely held business. If a proper goal of the 
transfer tax system is to increase the labor force participation of the inheritors of wealth, 
see infra Part 11.0.3., then it is not proper to grant the favorable treatment of I.R.C. 
§ 6601(j) to recipients of closely held businesses who do not participate in the operation 
of the business. Second, the benefits of I.R.C. §§ 6166, 6601(j) will be unavailable for 
certain closely held businesses that should receive favorable treatment under the estate tax 
laws. For example, an estate that fails to satisfy the 35% requirement of I.R.C. § 6166 
(a)(l) will receive no estate tax relief whatsoever, notwithstanding that it may make 
economic sense to tax the estate favorably due to ownership of a closely held business. 
Finally, the ostensible purpose of the I. R.C. § 6601(j) preferred interest rate is to relieve 
the liquidity concerns of small, closely held businesses. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TilE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 547 (1976). Professor Gutman observes, however, that eligibility under I.R.C. 
§ 6601(j) "is not determined by the size of the business or its cash-generating potential." 
Harry L. Gutman, Refonning Federal Wealrh Transfer Taxes after ERTA, 69 VA. L. REv. 
1183, 1263 (1983). The preferential interest rate thus provides a windfall to estates 
without liquidity concerns. ld. at 1263-64. 
80 Proposed legislation would reduce the J.R.C. § 6601(j) interest rate from 4% to 
zero. See AMERICAN FAMILY TAX REUEF ACT, 143 CONG. REC. S183, 105 Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 304 (granting a $153,000 interest-free loan to any estate with a $1,000,000 
closelr held business interest that qualifies under I.R.C. § 6166). 
8 See I.R.C. § 6166(8)(A)(iii) (1994). 
82 See I.R.C. § 317(b) (1994). 
83 See I.R.C. § 302(a) .(1994). The amount taxable upon a sale is the amount 
realized over the adjusted basis of the property. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1997). If the stock 
was a capital asset, then the gain is subject to a maximum 28% rate. See I.R.C. § l(h) 
(1997). 
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taxable as dividends. 84 The taxpayer usually prefers treatment as a sale or 
exchange. 85 
I.R.C. § 303 modifies the normal test for determining whether a 
distribution made by a corporation is taxable as a sale or exchange of stock 
or as ordinary income. Under I.R.C. § 303(a), a distribution of property to 
a shareholder in redemption of stock that is includible in a decedenfs estate 
is taxed as a sale of stock rather than as a dividend to the extent of estate, 
inheritance, and other transfer taxes, as well as certain funeral and 
administration expenses. 86 I.R.C. § 303 provides a mechanism for 
removing cash or other property from a corporation on a tax efficient basis 
if the property is needed to pay estate taxes or other expenses incurred at 
death. 
I.R.C. § 303(b) limits the availability of this special treatment. 81 The 
most important limitation is that the value of the decedent's stock ownership 
interest must exceed 35% of the excess of the value of the gross estate over 
the sum of the amounts allowable to the estate for estate tax deductions 
under l.R.C. §§ 2053, 2054.88 If the decedent's estate includes stock in two 
or more corporations of which 20% or more of the value of the outstanding 
stock is included in the gross estate, the stock of all corporations involved is 
treated as the stock of a single corporation for purposes of applying the 35% 
limitation. 89 These p~rcentage limitations substantially restrict the 
availability of I.R.C. § 303 treatment. 
84 See I.R.C. §§ 302(d), 316 (1994). If the redemption is treated as a dividend, then 
the entire amount is included in gross income and subject to a maximum 39.6% rate. See 
I.R.C. § 30l(c)(1) (1994). 
85 Cf. supra notes 83-84 (distinguishing between exchanges and dividends). 
86 See I.R.C. § 303(a) (1994). 
87 See I.R.C. § 303(b) (1994). 
88 See I.R.C. § 303 (b)(2)(A) (1994). I.R.C. § 303(b)(2)(A) refers to "allowable" 
deductions. Thus, for purposes ofthis limitation, the I.R.C. §§ 2053, 2054 expenses need 
not be actually deducted on the estate tax return. For example, expenses of admin-
istration that are deducted on the income tax return for the estate and, accordingly, are 
not eligible for deduction on the estate tax return are nevertheless taken into account for 
purposes of the l.R.C. § 303(b)(2)(A) limitation. See l.R.C. § 642(g} (1994 & Supp. 
1996~9 
See l.R.C. § 303(b)(2)(B) (1994). 
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Another significant limitation is that I.R.C. § 303 treatment is 
available only to the extent that the redeeming shareholder's interest in the 
decedent's estate is reduced by estate, inheritance, or death taxes, or by 
funeral or administration expenses. This limitation is a significant trap for 
the unwary. For example, if a decedent's stock is distributed as part of a 
pre-residuary disposition under the will, the pre-residuary gift will generally 
bear no portion of the taxes and administration expenses, 90 and the benefits 
of I.R.C. § 303 will accordingly be unavailable. Furthermore, in the 
typical estate plan for a married couple, under which all estate taxes are 
deferred until the death of the surviving spouse, the benefits of I.R.C. § 303 
at the death of the first spouse will be minimal because the only eligible 
charges to the I.R.C. § 303 property will be funeral and administration 
expenses. 
E. Valuation Difficulties Facing Closely Held Businesses 
Interests in closely held businesses are difficult to value. 91 The 
valuation difficulties are primarily attributable to the lack of a market for 
the interest (particularly if it is a minority interest) and the lack of 
comparable businesses for which valuation information is readily available. 
The difficulties increase when the principal of the business has died, because 
the historical earnings of the business may no longer be relevant to current 
value. 
These valuation difficulties create numerous practical problems for 
the small business owner who wishes to transfer property during life or at 
death. If the owner transfers the interest during life without accurate 
valuation, the owner or her successors face potential liability for gift taxes, 
penalties, and interest. Even tax-free gifts that deplete the donor's unified 
credit present valuation difficulties. If the donor inaccurately values the 
gift, this inaccuracy continues into the donor's estimation of her remaining 
unified credit and may result in the unanticipated imposition of gift taxes for 
00 A typical will charges the payment of death taxes and administration expenses to 
the residue of the estate. Thus , in most cases a pre-residuary disposition would not 
satis~ the requisites ofi.R.C. § 303(b)(2)(B) (1994). 
1 See Shishido, supra note 6, at 65 ; JOHN A. BOGDANSKI , FEDERAL TAX VALUATION 
, 1.02 (1996). 
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later transfers. 92 Moreover, the passage of time does not prevent the 
Service from challenging this inaccuracy in the remaining unified credit. 
That is, no statute of limitations prevents the Service from arguing for a 
higher tax liability on current transfers due to past inaccuracies in 
determining the remaining unified credit amount. 93 
The inability to obtain accurate business valuations affects the owner's 
estimation of estate taxes that will be due at death. If the owner wishes to 
transfer the business interest at death, it may be impossible to estimate 
accurately the funds that will be needed to pay the attendant estate taxes. 
Until recently, buy-sell agreements could fix the value of a business for 
estate tax purposes under certain circumstances. The enactment of I.R.C. 
§ 2703 in 1990 significantly curtailed the usefulness of this technique for 
most intra-family business transfers.94 
F. Summary 
The gift tax on inter vivos transfers allows for an annual exclusion 
and imposes a lower effective rate than the estate tax imposes on testamen-
92 Suppose A has her full $600,000 unified credit amount. She makes a gift to B, 
and the gift does not qualify for the annual exclusion. On her gift tax return, A values the 
gift at $100,000, but the Service could successfully argue that its true value is $150,000. 
Under A's erroneous view, she has $500,000 remaining in her unified credit amount. 
Under the Service's correct view, she has only $450,000. If, in a later year, A makes a 
gift of $500,000, she will owe gift taxes on $50,000, notwithstanding that the earlier gift 
was returned at $100,000. See I.R.C. § 2504(c) (1994) (stating that the value reported on 
the earlier return is binding on a later return filed after the statute of limitations has run 
on the earlier return only if gift taxes actually were paid on the earlier return, and the 
consumption of unified credit is not considered payment of taxes). A's mistake on the 
earlier return not only affects her ability to make future tax-free gifts in excess of 
$450,000, but also affects the ability of her estate to detennine her estate tax liability with 
accuracy. 
93 See I.R.C. § 2504(c) (1994). Again, an example may clarify this point. Under 
the previous footnote, A inaccurately valued a gift at $100,000, whereas the true value 
was $150,000. Suppose A dies twenty years later without having made any gifts in the 
interim, and her taxable estate is worth $500,000. The Service could argue that A's estate 
must pay tax on $50,000. That is , no statute of limitations binds the Service to A's 
estimate that her earlier gift was worth only $100,000. 
94 See I.R.C. § 2703 (1994) (stating that the value of property is determined without 
regard to agreements concerning price or restrictions on the right to sell). 
SPRING 1997 The Proper Role of Estate and Gift Taxation 119 
tary transfers. Thus, donors have an incentive to transfer wealth pursuant 
to a series of small lifetime gifts rather than pursuant to a single testamen-
tary transfer. The income tax, however, prefers testamentary transfers by 
increasing the basis only in testamentary transfers. Finally, the Code 
includes several provisions that reduce some of the hardships of the estate 
and gift tax on closely held businesses, although none of the provisions 
affords significant relief. Furthermore, although these provisions reduce 
some of the costs associated with the death of a closely held business owner, 
they fail to address in a satisfactory manner the appropriate taxation of the 
closely held business interest itself. The interest should be taxed in the first 
place only if doing so furthers the legitimate goals of the transfer tax 
system. 
III. ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION GOALS 
The goals of federal transfer taxation are central to this Article. 
These goals determine the proper transfer taxation of interests in closely 
held businesses. Commentators have proposed the following goals: 
generating revenue, supplementing the income tax, and promoting 
egalitarian principles. This Article does not dispute the importance of these 
goals; rather, it demonstrates that neither the present transfer tax system nor 
any realistic alternative to it accomplishes these goals. This Article, 
however, develops an additional goal-the transfer tax system should 
minimize the harmful effects of gratuitous transfers upon donees' work 
efforts. 
A. Generating Revenue 
The estate and gift tax does not produce significant revenues for the 
federal government. 95 The amount the government collects from this tax is 
95 See BITI'KER & CLARK, supra note 16, at 1; Donaldson, supra note 4, at 543; 
McCaffery, supra note 4, at 300-04; Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to 
Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 269-70 (1983}; cf Ascher, supra note 15, at 72-73 (describing 
the underutilization by the government of estate and gift taxation to produce revenue). 
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a relatively small percentage of its total revenues. 96 Although the govern-
ment raised $11.5 billion from this tax in 1990, this amount represented 
only 1.12% of its total revenue and only 0.213% of the gross domestic 
product. en 
This sum is even more insignificant in light of the governmental costs 
of administering the tax. Professor John E. Donaldson observes that the tax 
"requires an inordinate amount of attention at the highest levels of govern-
ment, especially in relation to the relative insignificance of the revenues 
generated. "98 Moreover, tax planning and litigation are costly to taxpayers 
and occupy the talents and energy of a substantial portion of the bar and 
other professions. 99 
In summary, the tax generates small amounts of revenue, and its 
administration is expensive to the government and taxpayers. Thus, the 
goal of revenue generation provides no substantial basis for the existence of 
the transfer tax system and yields no background against which to analyze 
the transfer taxation of closely held businesses. 100 
B. Supplementing the Income Tax 
The estate and gift tax conceivably supplements the income tax in two 
ways. First, the estate and gift tax might heighten the progressivity of the 
income tax rates. Second, the estate and gift tax might remedy certain 
failures of the income tax system. It is questionable, however, whether the 
estate and gift tax achieves these goals as effectively as might other 
measures. 
96 See McCaffery, supra note 4, at 301 (stating that "the actual yield ofthe[se] taxes 
is low"). 
97 See id. at 301 & n.69 (citing Office of Management & Budget, Budget of the 
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1992: Historical Tables, tbls. 1.1, 1.3, 2.S 
{199~). 
Donaldson, supra note 4, at 548 (footnote omitted}. 
99 See id. at 549-50; McCaffery, supra note 4, at 302. 
100 Cj. JOHN RAWlS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971) (endorsing transfer taxation 
"not to raise revenue"). 
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Commentators have asserted that the estate and gift tax operate to 
buttress the progressive rates of the income tax. 101 Professor Michael J. 
Graetz believes that progressive income tax rates may be self-defeating and 
that the estate and gift tax is necessary to save progressivity. 102 This 
observation is true, he finds, because of the following effects. First, higher 
marginal income tax rates discourage the productivity of affected 
taxpayers. 103 Second, high rates encourage affected taxpayers to engage in 
more legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion.104 Hence, the argument 
goes, the estate and gift tax is necessary to preserve progressivity. 
Professor Donaldson, although not disputing the above arguments, 
questions them as being dated. Professor Graetz wrote his article, To 
Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, in 1983. In the article, he called for 
the reinvigoration of the estate and gift tax following its modification in 
1981105 to restore progressivity to the entire system of taxation. 106 Professor 
Donaldson, however, observes that the United States Congress has ignored 
Professor Graetz's call. Professor Donaldson writes, 
[A]bsent a congressional resolve to reverse the direction of the 
1981 legislation and to expand the scope of transfer taxes by 
... increasing the effective progressivity of the transfer tax 
rate structure, the existing estate and gift tax system has no 
meaningful role as a contributor to progressivity. The prospect 
of such changes is remote and even proponents of the pro-
gressivity role of transfer taxation are pessimistic that restora-
tion of such a role is politically possible. 107 
101 See Donaldson, supra note 4, at 543 (citing Graetz, supra note 95, at 271; 
Gutman, supra note 79, at 1185). 
102 See Graetz, supra note 95, at 272. 
103 See id. at 273. 
104 See id. Professor Graetz also points to certain "preference provisions," such as 
lower rates on capital gains , which diminish progressivity. 
105 Cf Donaldson, supra note 4, at 544 (citing Alicia H. Munnell, Wea/Jh Transfer 
Taxalion: TheRe/alive Role for Eslale and Income Taxes, NEW ENG. EcoN. REV., 
Dec. 1988, at 6) (describing how the percentage of taxpayers affected by the estate and 
gift tax has dropped to 1% following 1981 legislation). 
106 Graetz, supra note 95, at 284. 
107 Donaldson, supra note 4, at 544 (footnote omitted). 
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Progressivity in taxation may be a worthwhile goal. 108 Congress, however, 
is either unwilling to use the estate and gift tax for its promotion, or it has 
determined that the tax is an ineffective means toward the goal. 
The estate and gift tax may supplement the income tax in yet another 
way. Professor Paul B. Stephan notes that "[o]ne of the principal justifica-
tions for a separate tax on the transfer of wealth is that it plugs gaps in the 
income tax base. "109 The largest gap to which Professor Stephan refers is 
that "the income tax fails to include substantial portions of capital apprecia-
tion" 110 in assets that are not sold before their transfer during life or at 
death. 111 Under his argument, appreciation enriches the holders of the 
assets, but they pay no tax on this amount. The absence of a sale or 
exchange suspends the appreciation in the assets. According to Professor 
Stephan, the estate and gift tax limits the magnitude of this failure to tax 
capital appreciation by taxing gratuitous transfers, thereby preventing 
donors from completely escaping taxation when they transfer property with 
built in gain. 112 Professor Stephan finds further support for this role of the 
estate and gift tax by analyzing the different transfer tax treatments of gifts 
and transfers at death. The estate tax has a higher effective rate than does 
108 CJ Graetz, supra note 95, at 274-78; Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The 
Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 passim (1952) (defending 
the goal of progressivity in taxation). 
1CJ9Paul B. Stephan III, A Comment on Transfer Tax Reform, 72 VA. L. REV. 1471, 
1472 p986). 
1 0 Jd. at 1481. 
111 The Code generally taxes this appreciation upon the sale of the asset. See I.R.C. 
§ 100l(a) (1994). Bur cj I.R.C. § 1256 (1994) (taxing the increased appreciation of 
certain investment contracts on a year-to-year basis). 
112 D'fti . . 1 ~ '1 b . . ~ 1 enng margma rates among aamt y mem ers may create an mcenhve aor 
donors to make gifts with appreciated property. What if a donor had two pieces of 
property of equal value, but only one piece has appreciated? If the donor wanted to 
transfer one as a gift, and if the asset were likely to be sold in the near future, she would 
be inclined to choose the appreciated piece, because its appreciation would escape 
taxation in her hands. In most cases the donee, who is a family member, will be in a 
lower marginal income tax bracket than the donor, which means that a later disposition 
of the property will likely produce a lower overall income tax burden for the family as a 
group. A contrary incentive, however, is produced by the step-up in basis at death. See 
supra note 54 and accompanying text. If the property is likely to be sold over the long 
term, but not in the near term, the donor has an incentive to hold the appreciated property 
until death, thereby permitting the donee to obtain a new fair market value basis in the 
property. 
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the gift tax. 113 Moreover, recipients of testamentary property· take a 
stepped-up basis in the property, whereas recipients of inter vivos gifts do 
not. 114 To summarize, Professor Stephan observes that the income tax fails 
to tax capital appreciation when transferred either at death or in life. The 
estate and gift tax responds by separately taxing these transfers. In addition, 
the income tax prefers transfers at death over gifts by giving only the 
former an increased basis upon transfer. Again, the estate and gift tax 
responds by taxing transfers at death at a higher rate than gifts. 115 
Professor Stephan's pragmatic justification for the estate and gift tax 
reveals gaps in the income tax, but is not a satisfying justification for 
transfer taxation. His justification is illusory. Congress could directly solve 
these gaps, thereby rendering the estate and gift tax superfluous by Pro-
fessor Stephan's theory. Indeed, the gaps are probably solvable, through 
one of two alternative approaches. 
First, by amending I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1015,116 Congress could equalize 
the different bases that gifts and testamentary transfers take under current 
law. As noted earlier,117 under I.R.C. § 1014, most property received from 
a decedent receives a basis equal to the fair market value of the property at 
the decedent's death. This provision has long been criticized as a major tax 
loophole, 118 particularly in the absence of an estate tax burden at the 
decedent's death, as in the case of an estate passing entirely to a surviving 
spouse. 119 As observed by Professor Stephan, howe.•.'er, Congress in 1976, 
instituted the carryover basis for testamentary transfers, but apparently 
lacked the committnent for reform because it retroactively repealed the 
change in 1980. 121> 
113 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
114 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
115 . See Stephan, supra note 109, at 1482. 
116 See supra Part II. C. and accompanying text. 
117 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
118 See Gutman, supra note 79, at 1192 & n.26 (citing various authorities to this 
effect). 
119 See id. at 1235-39 (proposing that I.R.C. § 1014 not apply to transfers qualifying 
for the marital deduction). 
121> See Stephan, supra note 109, at 1485-86. 
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A second approach would be to treat death as an event that causes the 
recognition of capital gains. This approach avoids a problem associated 
with the 1976 carryover-basis legislation-the death tax basis adjustment. 
With a carryover basis system, it is necessary to increase the basis of appre-
ciated property by the death taxes attributable to the appreciation to make 
the consequences of carryover basis consistent with the tax results of selling 
appreciated property before death. 121 As explained by Professor Lawrence 
Zelenak in a recent article on this subject, in the 1976 legislation the basis 
adjustment was determined by multiplying the appreciation in each asset by 
the average death tax rate for the estate. 122 Although this approach is simple 
enough in concept, it creates significant practical difficulties because the 
basis of every appreciated asset in the estate is uncertain as long as the value 
of any of the assets is uncertain. 123 This problem is not encountered if death 
is a realization event, because all assets would receive a fair market value 
basis following the imposition of the tax. Moreover, carryover basis would 
require the maintenance of basis records over multiple generations, while 
realization at death would not. The realization-at-death approach also has 
significant revenue advantages. 124 As Professor Zelenak observes, 
·realization at death imposes the income tax at an ideal time in terms of 
ability to pay; the decedent has no use for the funds, and whatever the heirs 
receive is a windfall. 125 
Taxing capital gains at death is also supported by sound tax policy. 
As observed by Professor Joseph M. Dodge in a recent article responding 
to Professor Zelenak's argument, imposing capital gains tax at death is sup-
ported by at least four different policies: the internal logic of the income 
tax, economics, fairness, and distributive justice. 126 By internal logic, 
Professor Dodge means that, under a sound system of income taxation, "the 
same dollars should be neither taxed to, nor deducted by, a given taxpayer 
121 See Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361,368 
(1993!2 
1 See id. 
123 See id. (observing that this problem exists because the average death tax rate for 
the estate is a function of the value of every asset). 
124 See id. at 370 (pointing out that the realization-at-death approach would produce 
more than three times the additional revenue that would be produced by a carryover-basis 
approach). 
125 See id. at 367. 
126 Joseph M. Dodge, Further Thoughts on Realizing Gains and Losses at Death, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1827, 1838-42 (1994). 
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more than once. "127 In no respect is the taxation of gains at death inconsis-
tent with this principle. By economics, Professor Dodge is referring to the 
concept of economic neutrality-that a sound system of income taxation 
should minimize its impact on investment decisions. 128 As Professor Dodge 
observes, death is an ideal time to impose a tax on capital gains because the 
tax would affect economic choices only minimally. 129 As to tax fairness, 
Professor Dodge argues that taxing gains at death is consistent with the 
principle that taxpayers should contribute according to their ability to pay. 130 
Regarding the concept of distributive justice, Professor Dodge makes the 
point that sound tax policy should take into account the relative contributions 
made to tax revenues by various classes of society. 131 A rule taxing gains at 
death is consistent with this policy. Moreover, the tax cost is not borne by 
the transferor, who is dead, but by the transferees for whom the amounts 
received are, as Professor Dodge observes, "in the nature of a windfall. "132 
Assuming that inherited wealth is less worthy than earned wealth, taxing 
gains at death furthers vertical equity at a lower tax cost. 133 
In short, the gaps in the income tax base described by Professor 
Stephan134 can be addressed directly either by instituting a carryover-basis 
rule or by taxing gains at death. The use of the estate and gift tax as an 
indirect backstop to these gaps is, therefore, both unnecessary and 
unsatisfying as a policy matter. 
To summarize, commentators have argued that the estate and gift tax 
supplements the income tax by periodically taxing accumulated wealth and 
by buttressing the progressive rates of the income tax. The estate and gift 
tax does not substantially add to the progressivity of the income tax, nor 
does it need to do so. Congress could easily change the income tax rates. 
Arguably, the estate and gift tax may strengthen areas where the income tax 
127 ld. at 1839. 
128 See id. at 1840. 
129 See id.; see also id. at 1836-37 (arguing that pennitting realized appreciation to 
escare income taxation favors capital appreciation over other types of income). 
130 See id. at 1840-41. 
131 See Dodge, supra note 126, at 1841 (observing that this is accomplished, in part, 
by the progressive rate structure, which produces so-called vertical equity). 
132 Id. 
133 See id. 
134 See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text. 
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is weak by taxing appreciated property when transferred. The necessity, 
however, of the estate and gift tax as a response to problems in the income 
tax is dubious. Congress should not indirectly and halfheartedly address 
these problems under the estate and gift tax. This Subpart shows that the 
estate and gift tax does little to accomplish income tax related goals; 
supporting the income tax does not justify the estate and gift tax. As such, 
the relationship between the income tax and the estate and gift tax does not 
present a framework by which to analyze the estate and gift taxation of 
closely held businesses. 
C. Reducing the Unfairness of Disparate Accumulations of Wealth 
Perhaps the estate .and gift tax serves some political goal beyond the 
production of revenue or the protection of the income tax base. The 
American Bar Association states, "[t]he transfer taxes serve, among other 
purposes, to limit the perpetuation of large private concentrations of wealth 
••• .''
135 Yet, why should concentrations of wealth be limited? A possible 
answer lies in what Professor Edward J. McCaffery calls "the liberal 
egalitarian case for wealth transfer taxation.'' 136 
In a recent article in the Yale Law Journal, Professor McCaffery 
provides an overview of philosophical arguments for limiting wealth 
accumulation by imposing a wealth transfer tax. Professor McCaffery 
observes that modern philosophers see the transmission of private wealth as 
problematic. The transmission of private wealth interferes with the 
"equality of starting points." 137 Hence, wealth transfers interfere with the 
principle "that people of equal abilities and aptitudes 'should have the same 
135 American Bar Ass'n Section of Taxation Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructur-
ing, Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX. LAW. 395, 396 (1988); see also 
McCaffery, supra note 4, at 289 (noting that reducing private accumulations of wealth is 
a purported goal for the estate and gift tax); Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and 
Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 241, 249 ("It is sometimes said 
that a wealth transfer tax curbs undue accumulations of wealth."). 
136 McCaffery, supra note 4, at 289 (lower case added). 
137 /d. at 290 (citing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE 
202-27 (1980)). 
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prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system, that 
is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born!"138 
Professor McCaffery criticizes this argument on practical and 
philosophical grounds. First, he argues that the current estate and gift tax 
"encourages frequent, large, inter vivos gifts, "139 and that no stronger 
alternative to this system is politically feasible. 140 Second, he believes that 
a stronger alternative would encourage the wealthy to consume, rather than 
transfer, their wealth, thereby substituting inequality of consumption for 
inequality of wealth. 141 Moreover, an estate and gift tax runs counter to the 
liberal ideal that wssession of earned wealth is just. People hold this wealth 
as capital, which supports the material needs of society. Indeed, the estate 
and gift tax encourages consumption, and thus the dissipation, of this 
wealth.142 
Hence, egalitarian philosophical arguments do not satisfactor.Hy justify 
the estate and gift tax. 143 The liberal ideal of equality of starting points 
conflicts with the liberal ideals of saving and thrift, thereby leaving the 
estate and gift tax in a philosophical limbo. This egalitarian justification 
fails, providing no model in which to analyze the transfer taxation of 
interests in closely held businesses. 
D. An Economic Justification of the Estate and Gift Tax 
The estate and gift tax decreases gratuitously transferred wealth. 
Perhaps by doing so the tax encourages the productive work effort of 
potential recipients. More than one hundred years ago, Andrew Carnegie 
wrote, 
138 /d. at 292 (quoting Rawls, supra note 100, at 73). 
139 . McCaffery, supra note 4, at 294; cf supra note 41 and accompanymg text 
(describing the $10,000 per donee annual exclusion from gift tax). 
140 See McCaffery, supra note 4, at 294. 
141 See id. at ·295. 
142 See id. at 295-96. 
143 Professor McCaffery advocates abolition of the income tax and the estate and gift 
tax. In their place, he would institute a "progressive consumption-without-estate tax." 
ld. at 296, 345-58. 
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I have therefore endeavored to prove that at the root of the 
desire to bequeath to children there lay the vanity of the 
parents, rather than a wise regard for the good of the children. 
That the parent who leaves his son enormous wealth generally 
deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts him to 
lead a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would, 
seems to me capable of proof which cannot be gainsaid. It is 
many years since I wrote in a rich lady's album, "I should as 
soon leave to my son a curse as the almighty dollar." 144 
This Article argues that reducing the heir's temptation to "lead a less useful 
and less worthy life"145 is a worthwhile goal of the estate and gift tax. 
1. Microeconomic Analysis of Inheritance and Recipients' Worlc 
Efforts 
The argument that inheritance reduces the incentive for recipients to 
work productively has popular appeal beyond Carnegie's conjecture. 
Lotteries are an appropriate analogy to inheritance and to large inter vivos 
gifts. Both involve individuals who receive wealth by chance, that is, by 
choosing the right numbers or having affluent relatives. Popular tales 
abound of how individuals win a lottery, retiring from their jobs to lead a 
life of relaxation, if not luxury. 146 The media also contain stories of how 
144 Andrew Carnegie, The Advantages of Poverty, in THE GOSPEL OF WEAL Til AND 
OrnER 'nMELY ESSAYS, 43 , 49-50 (1933). 
145 ld. 
146 See, e.g., Shannon Tanganan, A $101.8M Ticket ro Retirement-Phoenix Couple 
HillheJackpot, U.S.A. TODAY, March 7, 1995, at 3A (describing how one couple went 
into retirement overnight after winning the lottery). 
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recipients of large inheritances withdraw from productive activities147 or 
never engage in them at all because of large inheritances. 148 
The idea that recipients of large inheritances withdraw from 
productive work is intuitively appealing, and this intuition finds a theoretic 
justification in microeconomic analysis. Individuals work, for the most 
part, to buy goods and services from the larger economy. The worker 
receives pay and uses it to buy these goods and services. Another tenet of 
microeconomics is that more goods and services are better than fewer. 149 
Under this analysis, workers would constantly work to maximize their 
ability to purchase the desired goods and services. 
This conclusion is, of course, absurd. The analysis is not flawed, but 
it is incomplete. One specific economic good is leisure (or the absence of 
work), and its value prevents individuals from constantly working. As one 
text states, "[t]he decision to work is ultimately a decision about how to 
spend time." 150 Presumably, workers want leisure just as they want the 
goods and services previously discussed. Workers do not buy leisure in the 
traditional sense, but "cquiring it is not without cost. Leisure has an 
opportunity cost-an hour of leisure costs the worker an hour of pay. 151 
The value an individual places on leisure, compared with the value 
placed on other goods and services, determines the individual's work 
effort.152 An individual participates in work, or any other activity, at a level 
147 By "productive" we mean work or activities that return wealth or the expectancy 
of wealth as a direct result of the work or activity. Hence, philanthropic activities would 
not come within our discussion, because society at large would receive the tangible return 
(other than the philanthropist's personal satisfaction). We do not mean to say that 
philanthropy is not productive, but that it is distinct from what most people would call 
work. 
148 See, e.g., Eric Morganthaler, Oh Lucky Man: His Life is a Cruise, Year in, 
Year Out, WAILST.I., Dec. ·20, 1991 at Al (describing how one heir to a multimillion 
dollar estate has never worked and spends much of his time taking cruises). 
149 See EDWIN MANSAEID, MICROECONOMICS 50 (1991) (assuming "the consumer 
alwa~s prefers more of a commodity than less"). 
SO ROBERT G. EHRENBERG & ROBERTS. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 179 
(1991). 
151 See id. at 180 (assuming that "leisure's opportunity cost is the wage rate") 
(emphasis deleted). 
152 See id. at 153-54. Economists analyze the work decision by dividing goods into 
two categories: leisure and money income. 
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such that the marginal utility of the gain from the activity equals its marginal 
cost. 153 This is a central holding of modern microeconomics.154 The 
marginal gain from a unit of work is the accompanying increase in wealth 
that allows the worker to purchase extra goods and services. The marginal 
cost is the foregone leisure that the worker would have enjoyed without the 
extra work effort. Hence, the worker balances the value of work (i.e. , the 
wealth that it produces) and the value of leisure in determining his or her 
individualleyel of work. 155 
How does increased wealth affect this balance? Economic theory 
supports the notion that increased wealth causes people to work less. 
Typically, economists expect that increases in wealth or income cause 
people to consume more of the goods they want. These goods are normal 
goods. 156 Conversely, consumers consume less of other goods when wealth 
increases. These goods are inferior goods. 157 
Economists consider inferior goods to be atypical. Examples of 
inferior goods usually include inexpensive substitutes for other goods. 158 
Leisure hardly fits within this description because it has few, if any, 
substitutes. Economists typically assume that leisure is a normal good, 159 
153 Economists analyze this situation by looking at consumers' budget constraints and 
their preferences for combinations of goods. See id. at 156-59. The budget constraint 
represents the worker's ability to consume leisure versus other goods. The preferences 
represent the worker's willingness to substitute one good for another (e.g., the value of 
an extra unit of leisure versus the value inherent in an extra hour of wages) . At the 
optimal work level for the consumer, the ability to exchange leisure for other goods 
corresponds to the willingness to do so. A leading microeconomics text states: 
The rate at which the consumer is willing to substitute good X for good Y 
(holding satisfaction constant) must equal the rate at which he or she is able to 
substitute good X for good Y. Otherwise it is always possible to find another 
market basket that will inl.!rease the consumer's satisfaction. 
MANSAELO, supra note 149, at 79. 
154 Cf. EDWIN MANSAElD, MICROECONOMICS 50 (1991) ("This is a famous re-
sult-and a very useful one that should be understood fully.") 
155 See supra note 153 (examining this balance of work and leisure time). 
156 See MANSAELD, supra note 154, at 89. 
157 See id. 
158 Cf. EHRENBERG & SMml, supra note 150, at 179 (describing public transportation 
as an inferior good); MANSAElD, supra note 154, at 90 (describing oleomargarine as an 
inferior good). 
159 See Douglas Holtz-Eakin & David Joulfaian, The Carnegie Conjecture: Some 
Empirical Evidence, 108 Q.J. EcoN. 413, 414 (1993). 
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although the empirical evidence as to the normalcy of leisure has been 
ambiguous. 1ro 
If leisure is a normal good, then increases in wealth are accompanied 
by decreases in work effort. That is, wealthier workers consume more 
leisure by decreasing their work effort. Inheritance is a pure increase in 
wealth that is not associated with any work effort. 161 Thus, economic theory 
supports the notion that inheritance decreases the recipient's work effort. 
To summarize, leisure is an economic good. Its cost is the foregone 
wages that the worker did not earn while consuming leisure. Workers 
determine their work effort by balancing their desire for more wealth with 
their desire for more leisure. Inheritance affects this balance because it 
gives the recipient the means to consume more leisure by working less. 
Leisure is probably a normal good because people will consume more of it 
given an increase in their wealth. Hence, under this microeconomic analy-
sis, inheritance provides a disincentive to work. 
1ro See id. (citing John Pencavel, Labor Supply of Men: A Survey, in HANDBOOK OF 
LABoR EcONOMICS 63-64 (1986)). Bur see infra Part III .D.2. (finding labor participation 
to decline with large inheritance). 
161 By •pure• we mean that inheritance does not result from higher wages. Thus, it 
does not increase the marginal cost of leisure. A wage increase is an impure increase in 
wealth from this viewpoint. A wage increase certainly makes the worker wealthier 
if the worker continues with the same work effort. The wage increase also increases the 
marginal cost of leisure, which is the hourly wage itself. This effect makes leisure more 
expensive. If leisure is a normal good, an increase in the hourly wage pulls the worker 
in two directions. First, the increased wealth draws the worker to consuming more 
leisure. Second, the higher wage draws the worker to consuming less leisure because it 
is now more expensive. Essentially, the increased wage gives the worker the means to 
consume more leisure, but also makes it more expensive. See MANSFlELD, supra note 
159, at 89-90. 
Leisure, as an economic good, has an interesting feature in this context. Ordinarily, 
when the price of a good (e.g., bread) goes up, the consumer is poorer because available 
income will now buy less of the good. If that good is a normal good, then the consumer 
will necessarily consume less of it; the decreased wealth and the increased price relative 
to other goods will convince the consumer to consume less of it. In contrast, the price of 
leisure is the wage rate. If the price of leisure (i.e., wages) increases, then the consumer 
ofleisure becomes wealthier. Thus, if leisure is a normal good, it is ambiguous whether 
the consumer chooses to work more or less after a wage increase. 
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2. Empirical Evidence of the Effect of Inheritance on Worlc Efforts 
In a recent article, 1he Carnegie Conjecture: Some Empirical 
Evidence, 162 three researchers set out to learn whether inheritance affects 
labor market participation. Labor participation is a binary decision. Under 
the researchers' model, an individual participated in the labor market if the 
individual had any earnings from wages, salary, or a sole proprietorship. 163 
Participation is distinct from supply. Whereas labor participation is a yes-
no decision, supply reflects the number of hours worked. Supply is difficult 
to measure because of the lack of statistics for hours worked. 164 
The researchers analyzed estate tax returns of decedents who died in 
1982. The decedents' estates filed the returns in 1982 or 1983. The 
researchers matched these estate tax returns with the 1982 and 1985 income 
tax returns of the beneficiaries. 165 The estate tax returns identified the 
amount of individual inheritances and the beneficiaries. The income tax 
returns provided information on the recipients' work efforts before and after 
receiving their inheritances. Specifically, the researchers considered a 
recipient of an inheritance to be a participant in the labor market if the 
participant had any wage, salary, or sole proprietorship earnings. 166 
The researchers also obtained information on the labor participation 
of joint filers. At the time of the study, the Code and the relevant income 
tax return contained information allowing the researchers to determine 
whether Qne, both, or neither of the spouses participated in the labor 
market. 167 
162 Holtz-Eakin & Joulfaian, supra note 159. 
163 See id. at 416. 
164 See id. at 417. 
165 See id. at 416. 
166 See id. at 417. 
167 See Holtz-Eakin & Joulfaian, supra note 159. The specific infonnation relates to 
a deduction based upon the earnings of the lower-earning spouse. The deduction was a 
percentage of these earnings. Hence, if the joint return reported no active income, then 
neither spouse participated in the labor market. If the joint return reported active income, 
but no special deduction, then only one spouse participated in the labor market. Finally, 
if the joint return reported active income and the special deduction, then both spouses 
participated in the labor market. The researchers obtained this infonnation for both 1982 
and 1985. 
SPRING 1997 The Proper Role of Estate and Gift Taxation 133 
The researchers used the income tax returns to examine the effect of 
the individuals' inheritances upon their respective transitions into and out of 
the labor force between 1982 and 1985.168 Thus, the researchers could 
compare the beneficiaries' labor force participation with the size of their 
inheritances. 
The researchers used the tax data to construct tables showing 
transitions into and out of the labor market. Using these tables, the 
researchers first observed the effects of inheritances on single filers. They 
concluded that Andrew Carnegie was in fact correct: 169 "higher inheritances 
are associated with a greater propensity to exit the market. "170 The most 
dramatic results occurred with inheritances of more than $150,000. Of 
individuals filing a single return with such inheritances, approximately 18% 
of those already in the labor market left it within three years of receiving the 
inheritance. 171 The researchers also noted that inheritance deters reentry to 
the labor market. 172 For example, of those not in the labor market in 1982, 
only 16% of those who inherited more than $150,000 had entered by 
1985.173 
The researchers also constructed tables demonstrating the effects of 
inheritances on joint tilers. These results were even more dramatic than 
those for single filers, and the most meaningful transition was from two 
earners to one earner. If both husband and wife were in the labor market 
before receiving an inheritance of over $150,000, approximately 34% of the 
time one or both of them left it within three years. 174 
The researchers tested these results by using multi-variate analysis 
that isolated the effect of increasing age on leaving the work force. They 
found that the effect of inheritance was still significant. 175 
168 See id. at 415. 
169 See id. at 420. 
170 See id. 
171 See id. at 418. 
m See id. at 422 (noting that not all of these results were statistically significant). 
173 See id. at 420. 
174 See id. at 420..21. Of those cases where joint-tilers received inheritances over 
$150,000, both spouses worked in 259 instances in 1982. In 1985, both spouses left the 
work place 7 times (2.7%) and one spouse left 80 times (30.9%). This leads to a total of 
33.59% when at least one spouse left (derived by (80+7)/259=0.3359). 
17s See id. at 424-26. 
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In a more recent article, two researchers investigated the relationship 
between inheritance and labor supply. 176 Labor supply and participation, as 
stated before, are distinct. Workers may work fewer hours or at an easier 
job for less pay. If so, they reduce their labor supply, but still participate in 
the labor force. These researchers found that ''the labor disincentive of 
inheritance is fairly small. "177 For the largest estates, however, the 
researchers excluded from consideration those who left the labor force after 
receiving the inheritance.178 Hence, the researchers of labor supply ignored 
the very subjects whom the earlier researchers found most interesting: 
those who left the labor market. 179 This approach may seem curious 
because it excludes the biggest changes from the study. The value of this 
approach, however, lies in its ability to explain workers' reactions to 
inheritance at the margin. The'earlier research provided clear support that 
inheritance lures people out of the labor market. The later research 
provides equally clear support that those who resist the lure, by and large, 
resist it completely. Hence, the articles provide a general observation: 
recipients of a large inheritance are less likely to work at all. If beneficia-
ries do work, however, their work habits are not substantially different from 
before. 180 
Empirical evidence not only establishes that Andrew Carnegie was 
correct about the effect of inheritances on donees, but also supports an 
economic justification for the estate and gift tax. By imposing a tax on 
176 David Joulfaian & Mark 0. Wilhelm, Inheritance and Labor Supply, 29 J. HUM. 
REsOURCES 1205 (1994). David Joulfaian was also one of the three writers of The Carne-
gie Conjecture: Some Empirical Evidence. See Holtz-Eakin & Joulfaian, supra note 159. 
17 See Joulfaian & Wilhelm, supra note 176, at 1207; see also Holtz-Eakin & 
Joulfaian, supra note 159, at 430-32 (finding that effect on supply is less pronounced 
when keeping participation constant). 
178 See Joulfaian & Wilhelm, supra note 176, at 1225 ("However, when person-
years with very large changes in earnings are excluded ... the estimate falls to [low 
levels of disincentive]."). 
179 Cf id. at 1231 ("Indeed, excluding outliers in earnings changes in our models 
necessarily removes the observations containing exits from the labor market.") (footnote 
omitted). 
180 This observation is analogous to even earlier research on the effect of wage rates 
on primary and secondary earners in a family. This research found that the work effort 
(i.e., labor supply) of the secondary worker varies directly with the wage rate; however, 
the work effort of the primary earner is independent of the wage rate. See John 
Pencavel, Labor Supply of Men: A Survey, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 204 
(1986); MARK KlWNGSWOR1ll, LABOR SUPPLY 94 (1983). 
SPRING 1997 The Proper Role of Estate and Gift Taxation 135 
gratuitous transfers, the estate and gift tax prevents beneficiaries of 
gratuitously transferred property from failing to contribute their skills and 
efforts economically. Moreover, the estate and gift tax encourages regular 
lifetime donations of modest amounts rather than lump-sum inheritances. 
In sum, empirical research establishes that the receipt of modest 
inheritances affected labor-force participation less than larger ones. 181 
Additional research establishes that, absent effects on participation, 
inheritance minimally affects labor supply. 182 Thus, by reduc~ng large 
estates and forcing donors to give smaller, regular amounts during life, the 
estate and gift tax coerces donors to convert inheritances into a stream of 
lifetime gifts that do not disrupt labor participation. 
3. A Work-Based Policy of the Estate and Gift Tax 
Parts III.D.l and 2 of this Arpcle show that microeconomic theory 
and empirical research associate inheritance with lower worker effort. 
Moreover, the empirical research shows that the only statistically significant 
effect of inheritance is that heirs receiving large inheritances are more likely 
to leave the labor force. In contrast, when heirs continue to work their level 
of participation (measured by annual ~arnings) remains constant. 183 Thus, 
recipients of inherited wealth usually have a binary decision-making 
process. They will either leave work or stay. They will not, as a general 
rule, significantly decrease their work effort if they stay. 
Curiously, the estate and gift tax provides a relatively tailored remedy 
to this phenomenon. 184 First, the current system taxes only relatively large 
estates. 185 Second, the current system encourages wealthy individuals to 
181 Holtz-Eakin & Joulfaian, supra note 159, at 418. For example, only 4.57% of 
single return filers who received inheritances of less than $25,000 left the labor market 
within three years. Perhaps similar results would hold for recipients of planned giving 
who receive $10,000 in annual gifts from a parent or $20,000 a year from both parents 
together. However, these researchers did not study the effects of gifts on labor force 
partic~ation . 
1 See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra Part 111.0.2. 
184 We do not argue (or believe) that Congress ever considered this effect of the 
estate and gift tax. · 
185 See supra note 4 (discussing the wealthiest taxpayers who pay the tax). 
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transfer their wealth in an inter vivos stream of smaller gifts, rather than by 
a lump-sum at death. 186 
These two results diminish the harmful effects of gratuitous wealth on 
work effort. First, by reducing the largest estates, the system diminishes 
the likelihood that heirs will quit work; larger inheritances influence 
recipients more than smaller inheritances. Second, by converting large 
estates into a stream of lifetime gifts, the transfer of wealth is less likely to 
disrupt work effort. If the wealth is not enough to cause the recipient to 
leave the work force, its effect is not significant. Therefore, the estate and 
gift tax is a suitable response to the problem of heirs leaving the work force. 
Public policy, through the estate and gift tax, should, as a normative 
matter, address the work efforts of heirs. Economically, attrition by heirs 
imposes real economic costs on society that may frustrate macroeconomic 
policy. Philosophically, encouraging the recipients of wealth to work 
ameliorates the injustice of unequal wealth. 
Individuals are prone to leave the work force when they inherit 
wealth. This phenomenon indicates that heirs do not foresee or rely upon 
1heir inheritance. If they did, they probably would have never worked at all 
or engaged in lower levels of work that they would continue after inheriting 
wealth. 187 Hence, future heirs may systematically fail to estimate the size or 
timing of their inheritance. .. 
This failure may cause future heirs to overinvest in human capital. If 
they knew they would leave the workforce, then their investments in human 
capital would decrease accordingly (as would their employers') . Invest-
ments in human capital are costly to the worker and society. 188 
When heirs leave the work force, their employers must find replace-
ments. If the heirs were highly skilled, the search is even more extensive 
186 See supra Part III.D.2. 
187 This observation is a corollary to the life-cycle model of labor supply. The life-
cycle model implies that people work the most during the stages in their lives when they 
are most productive. Early in life, they spend their time investing in human capital. In 
the middle they work. In the end, they stop working for various reasons. See generally 
Ehrenberg & Smith, supra note 150, at 242-53. 
188 See id. at 301 (describing the costs of investments in human capital). 
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and costly. These activities cause real social costs. 189 Encouraging 
beneficiaries to work reduces these costs. 
Full economic productivity and full employment are important 
macroeconomic goals. Workers leaving the work force endanger these 
goals. By encouraging work force participation from heirs, the estate and 
gift tax augments the macroeconomic goals of full productivity and full 
employment. 
Previously, this Article discussed the failure of the estate and gift tax 
to achieve egalitarian justice. 190 Specifically, the current system does not 
decrease inherited wealth to achieve true equality in starting points for 
members of society. Furthermore, any stronger alternative may endanger 
capital production or encourage ostentatious consumption by the producers 
of wealth. 
Although the current system may not substantially decrease wealth, it 
may have an effect on the work efforts of recipients. By enco-uraging heirs 
to work, the current system makes inequality more palatable. 191 The ineq-
uity remains because the rich stay rich. However, the inequity is not so 
large because the rich stay in the work force. 
Indeed, work may be virtuous in itself. Andrew Carnegie described 
inheritance as a curse because the heir might never have the chance to find 
her own way. 192 Presumably, Carnegie meant that the heir did not know 
any better than to leave the work force, where one finds the moral value of 
productive work. The estate and gift tax may act in a paternalistic manner 
to save the heirs from themselves so that they find virtue in work. 
In summary, the estate and gift tax plays a rational role in encourag-
ing work by recipients of gratuitous wealth. 193 Indeed, aspects of the estate 
and gift tax are seemingly tailored to this task. Furthermore, encouraging 
189 EHRENBERG & SMI1ll, supra note 150 at 166 ("firms incur significant costs in 
hirin,~mployees "). 
See supra Part III. C. 
191 Cf. RAWLS, supra note 100, at 73 (distinguishing between a frugal capitalist class 
and an indulgent aristocracy) . 
192 Carnegie, supra note 144, at 50. 
193 See supra Part 111.0.3. 
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work effort by heirs is a sensible policy. Economically, attrition from work 
creates social costs and disrupts macroeconomic policy. Philosophically, 
encouraging work decreases the inequity of disparate wealth and leads heirs 
into finding the virtue of productiye work. -
4. Summary 
Andrew Carnegie's intuition and modern economic research point to 
one achievable goal for transfer taxation-encouraging recipients of donated 
wealth to engage in productive work. The empirical research establishes 
that recipients of large inheritances are much more likely to exit the labor 
force than are other workers. Yet, those who do stay in the labor force are 
not particularly prone to decrease their supply of labor. Hence, only 
relatively large inheritances affect labor supply by prompting some workers 
to exit. The federal estate and gift tax remedies this problem in two ways. 
First, it decreases large inheritances by taxing them-{fecreased inheritances 
create less disruption in the labor market. Second, it coerces donors to 
transfer their wealth in smaller, lifetime gifts rather than by larger 
inheritances. Smaller gifts do not disrupt the labor market as do larger 
inheritances. Government has a proper role in encouraging heirs to work. 
Doing so reduces social costs and promotes social justice. This justification 
is the model that the next section of this Article uses to explore the proper 
transfer taxation of interests in closely held businesses. 
IV. CWSELY HELD BUSINESSES UNDER THE EsTATE 
AND GIFT TAX 
Part II of this Article reviewed the estate and gift tax provisions and 
the specifics of their application to closely held businesses. Part III justified 
and explained this regime by examining the effects of inheritance on labor 
participation. This Part examines the gratuitous transfer of closely held 
businesses under that justification. The argument that the estate and gift tax 
encourages productive work by donees does not apply in one context. If the 
taxed transfer is of a business in which the donee will participate, the estate 
and gift taxes do not further this goal. In this situation, the donee is already 
engaged in productive work and does not need the Code for persuasion into 
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productivity. Thus, Congress should reconsider the taxation of the transfer 
of interests in closely held businesses. 
Interests in closely held businesses are analytically distinct from other 
property. The recipient of securities, real estate, and cash may not work to 
maintain the assets. Most income from these assets is passive income. The 
holder of a large interest in a closely held business may, however, 
undertake actively to manage or participate in the business. Thus, these 
interests are inherently distinct from other forms of donated wealth. 
Part III. D described how beneficiaries of inheritances may decrease 
their labor force participation. The estate and gift tax ameliorates this 
problem by taxing larger estates. It also provides an incentive for donors to 
make lifetime gifts of property rather than giving all of their property in a 
lump sum at death. Nevertheless, this policy may not be relevant when the 
recipient of an interest in a closely held business intends to participate 
actively in its management. Here, the recipient already intends to meet the 
policy without encouragement by the Code. 
Beyond consumption, another reason for accumulating wealth exists. 
Many individuals enjoy giving some of their wealth to the natural objects of 
their bounty. The estate and gift tax, of course, curtails these gratuitous 
transfers. Hence, the tax is effectively a tax on capital because it reduces 
the attractiveness of capital to individuals. 194 
Presumably, individuals work to gain wealth. Wealth, of course, 
allows individuals to consume goods and services. But, people also produce 
wealth to pass to their children and other beneficiaries. 195 The ability to 
194 See Richard Wagner, INSmurE FOR REsEARCH ON THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, 
in FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXATION: A SlUDY IN SOCIAL COST, at 17-19 (1993) (arguing 
that, empirically, the federal estate tax has, and will continue to, depress the capital 
supplrt of the United States). 
That is, people want wealth not only for direct consumption, but also for donative 
purposes. Commentators continue to debate why people like giving away their wealth. 
The altruistic camp argues that giving away wealth confers direct enjoyment upon the 
donor. The services camp believes that people use gifts to family for control; that is, they 
extract services from family members (such as attentiveness and visits) in exchange for 
gifts and the promise of a pay-off at death. See B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic 
Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1045 (1983). 
Of course, it is possible that people obtain wealth for wealth's sake and give it to 
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consume and give away wealth makes greater wealth desirable. The estate 
and gift tax reduce the ability of individuals to enjoy their wealth fully 
because it limits gratuitous transfers. 196 The two effects of this limitation 
are fairly obvious. First, people will work less because the reward (wealth) 
is cheapened by the estate and gift tax. 197 Second, people will consume 
more and save less because the latter use is relatively more expensive than 
the former. 198 Both of these effects diminish society's supply of capital. 
The first retards its original formation, while the second accelerates its dissi-
pation. Thus, the estate and gift tax harmfully affects productive capital 
accumulations. 
Previously, this Article found justification for the estate and gift tax 
in its effect on recipients of wealth. 199 The estate and gift tax encourages 
productive work from potential recipients of inherited wealth in two ways. 
First, it discourages gratuitous transfers in general. Second, it encourages 
donors to structure their transfers into a stream of small, inter vivos gifts, 
which is less disruptive on labor supply than large, lump-sum inheritances. 
We assume, for the sake of argument, that the benefits of the estate 
and gift tax outweigh the costs. Americans gain from the tax by its 
encouragement of productive work by donees and to a lesser extent from its 
revenues. Americans lose from the tax by its discouragement of capital 
production. These are the stakes, and we assume that they favor retaining 
the basics of the current system. Nonetheless, when applied to closely held 
their children for want of a better use at death. See Ascher, supra note 15, at 100-01 
(hypothesizing that people accumulate wealth for its own sake). A corollary to this theory 
is that people do not have a strong desire to leave wealth to their children. Our expe--
riences cause us to question this argument, but we admit that it is an empirical question 
that we are not equipped to answer. 
196 Transfer taxation certainly does not prevent the passage of wealth, but it does 
coerce people into giving it away in awkward ways. Compare supra note 4 (arguing that 
transfer taxes do not stop the passage of wealth) with supra notes 139-42 and accompa-
nying text (arguing that transfer taxes encourage people to give their wealth in a stream 
of lifetime gifts, rather than all at death). 
197 See Ascher, supra note 15, at 101-02. 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 141-42 (arguing that the estate and gift tax 
creates inequality of consumption). 
199 See supra Part III .D. 
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businesses, the tax has no benefits, but still has costs. Hence, the estate and 
gift tax should have a different application to closely held businesses. 200 
The application of the tax should be different when it does not 
beneficially affect donees' work decisions. The primary benefit of estate 
and gift taxation evaporates when it taxes the transfer of interests in closely 
held businesses in which the recipients will participate. Estate and gift 
taxation benefits society by encouraging productive work on the part of 
recipients. If a recipient receives an interest in a closely held business and 
intends to manage the business, then no benefit exists for taxing the transfer 
of the business. 
The estate and gift tax has potentially adverse economic effects; its 
application to the transfer of interests in closely held businesses is not even 
neutral. The estate and gift tax indirectly levies a tax on capital. Part of the 
value of capital is the owner's ability to leave it to family and other loved 
ones. This cost is present in the taxation of closely held businesses, even 
though the benefits disappear. 
The special estate and gift tax provisions already in the Code do not 
properly address the problem of taxing the transfer of interests in closely 
held businesses. an The special use valuation rule of I.R.C. § 2032A simply 
allows certain recipients of interests in closely held businesses to escape 
what would otherwise be the unfair taxation of their interests based on 
highest and best use. When I.R.C. § 2032A applies, the business has a 
reduced going concern value, though the underlying property may be 
economically more valuable in another use.202 I.R.C. § 6166 provides relief 
from the illiquidity of closely held businesses when the recipients must pay 
estate tax. I.R.C. § 303 allows the owner of a closely held corporation to 
pay the estate tax attributable to the corporation with corporate assets 
without recognizing ordinary income. 203 Thus, none of these provisions 
200 We believe the question of whether the benefits outweigh the costs of the estate 
and gift tax is an empirical one, and outside the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, our 
analysis indicates that any benefits disappear in the context of closely held businesses. 
201 Cf supra Part II.D. (describing the special estate tax provisions applicable to 
close~ held businesses) . 
See id. 
203 See id. 
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provides the appropriate dispensation to recipients of closely held businesses 
from wealth transfer taxation. 
Current transfer taxation of closely held businesses retains all of the 
costs of the larger system, but none of the benefits. Moreover, the special 
provisions in the Code related to closely held businesses do not solve this 
dilemma because they do not address its central issue: interests in closely 
held businesses are distinct from other wealth. 
Congress should thus provide legislation that goes beyond the current 
treattnent of interests in closely held businesses. 204 Of course, any revisions 
of the Code should allow special treatment of closely held businesses only 
where the recipients of the interests plan actively to manage the business. 20S 
Moreover, special treatment should apply to transfers under the estate and 
gift tax, whereas currently the special provisions for closely held businesses 
apply only to the estate tax. 206 Preventing abuse by taxpayers may be diffi-
cult. 207 But, helping the transfer of closely held businesses and promoting 
the growth of productive capital are worth the effort. 
To summarize, Part III of this Article establishes that the estate and 
gift tax beneficially discourages recipients of gratuitous wealth from 
decreasing their work effort. This Part, however, applies the general 
justification for the estate and gift tax to a specific issue-the proper transfer 
taxation of interests in closely held businesses. This Part concludes that if 
204 Cf. AMERICAN FAMILY TAX REUEF ACT, supra note 80 (exempting a portion of 
qualified interests in closely held businesses from decedents' estates). 
205 Cf. I.R.C. § 2032A (1994) (allowing a special use valuation for real estate that is 
part of a fann or closely held business where the recipient materially participates in the 
operation of the farm or business). 
206 Cf. Letter from L. Henry Gissel, Jr., President, The American College ofTrust 
and Estate Counsel, to Representative Bill Archer, Chair, Committee on Ways & Means, 
United States House of Representatives (November 10, 1995), reprinted in 21 ACTEC 
NOTES 261 (1995). 
207 For example, an individual may own a closely held business and other wealth. 
If the Code provides a lower rate or other preferential treatment to the transfer of the 
closely held business, the individual will find it advantageous for the business to hold 
some of the other wealth. Because the individual's estate probably could offer a plausible 
business purpose for some such techniques (e.g., the individual arguably transferred 
securities to the business to allow the business to meet cash flow needs), interests in 
closely held businesses probably should not be completely exempt from transfer taxation. 
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the recipients of interests in closely held businesses intend to actively 
manage this business, then taxing the transfer of these interests does not 
further the general goal of transfer taxation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article began by providing an overview of the law of estate and 
gift taxation and then established a workable, economic theory for its 
imposition. The estate and gift tax is necessary to give donees the proper 
incentives to work. This policy is not valid, however, if the transferred 
wealth is an interest in a closely held business in which the donee will 
actively participate. In this situation, the estate and gift tax is detrimental. 
It interferes with the transferor's decision to accumulate or consume this 
wealth without the offsetting benefit of encouraging the donee to work. 
Thus, Congress should reconsider applying the estate and gift tax to closely 
held businesses. 
